UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY TOTTEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

No. C06-01907 JSW (BZ)

V.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

H.L. HEGGSTAD, INC.,

Defendant.

Defendant.

On July 5, 2006, the Honorable Jeffrey S. White referred to me for a report and recommendation plaintiffs' motion for entry of default judgment against defendant H.L. Heggstad, Inc. Defendant has never appeared in this action and did not respond to plaintiffs' motion.

On March 13, 2006, plaintiffs, Larry Totten and Jose

Moreno in their capacities as trustees of various trust funds¹

and the Northern California District Council of Laborers

Totten and Moreno filed suit in their capacities as trustees of the Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California, Laborers Vacation-Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California, Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California and Laborers Training and Retraining Trust Fund for Northern California (collectively, "Trust Funds").

("Council of Laborers") for itself and on behalf of Laborers'
Local 73, filed a petition and complaint under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
and section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, requesting confirmation of a
final and binding arbitration award entered against
defendant, an award of attorneys' fees and other relief.
According to the complaint, defendant is bound by a written
collective bargaining agreement, the Laborers' Master
Agreement and various Trust Agreements (collectively, the
"Agreements"), which obligate it to pay Trust Funds the hourly
amounts specified for each hour paid or worked by its
employees covered by the Agreements and to submit to an audit
to determine whether all fringe benefit contributions have
been timely paid. Compl. ¶¶ VI-VIII.

Plaintiffs further allege that because of a dispute over the application or interpretation of the Agreements, a grievance arose between the parties. Compl. ¶ XI. Pursuant to the Agreements, plaintiffs followed the steps outlined in the grievance procedure and ultimately submitted the dispute to the Board of Adjustment (the "Board") for a hearing in

The court has original jurisdiction over the LMRA and ERISA claims. 29 U.S.C. § 185(c); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim seeking confirmation of the arbitration award because it is "so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that [it] form[s] part of the same case or controversy."

³ Plaintiffs' counsel's answers at oral argument and the declarations of Andrea Atkins and Nicole Phillips also establish that defendant is bound by the Agreements.

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September 2004. Compl. ¶¶ X-XI. Defendant failed to appear. The Board issued an award in favor of plaintiffs by majority vote⁴ requiring defendant to pay plaintiffs sixty-nine hours of wages plus fringe benefits, sixty days waiting time for wages plus fringe benefits and \$50.00 for bounced check fees.

See Compl., Ex. C. In addition, the award requires defendant to submit to an audit to determine the fringe benefits due on behalf of all laborers covered who worked for defendant between the date of the last audit and the date of entry of the award. Id. Plaintiffs allege that they have made demands upon defendant to enforce the Board's award, but defendant has refused to comply. Compl. ¶ XIII. Plaintiffs filed this action in part to compel defendant to comply with the Board's award.

Plaintiffs served defendant with the complaint on April 7, 2006. Defendant did not answer or otherwise defend this action, and the Clerk entered defendant's default on May 9, 2006. By its default, defendant has admitted the well-pleaded averments of the complaint. <u>See</u> Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).

Plaintiffs moved for default judgment, which came on for hearing September 6, 2006 to determine the amount of damages.

Defendant failed to appear.

Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the court may enter a default judgment against a party against whom default has been entered. The decision to grant or deny a default judgment

Pursuant to the grievance procedure outlined in the Agreements, the participation of an impartial arbitrator was not required because the Board had reached a majority vote.

See Compl., Ex. A, Laborers' Master Agreement, Section 9.

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under Rule 55(b) is within the discretion of the court. <u>Eitel</u> v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

A court will not examine the merits of a dispute which the parties have submitted to arbitration under an agreement to be bound by the award. Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., 338 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965). "[I]f, on its face, the award represents a plausible interpretation of the contract in the context of the parties' conduct, judicial inquiry ceases and the award must be affirmed." Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1969). An arbitrator's award should not receive deference if the decision does not draw its essence from the contract and the arbitrator dispensed his own brand of industrial justice, the arbitrator exceeded the boundaries of issues submitted to him, or the award is contrary to public policy. See Federated Dep't. Stores v. United Foods & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494, 1496 (9th Cir. 1990). None of these exceptions exist in this case, and analyzing the award under this standard, I find that the Board's award is valid and enforceable.

The award does not specify dollar amounts for the wages and fringe benefits awarded. To prove these amounts, plaintiffs have submitted a declaration from Cedric Porter, the grievance chairman for the Council of Laborers and the assistant to the business manager. Mr. Porter is responsible for reviewing all district council grievances and is familiar with the district council's file for defendant. Mr. Porter

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avers that he was present at the hearing before the Board in September 2004 and that the minutes accurately represent what occurred. The Porter declaration establishes that the Board awarded a total of \$8,690.26 in wages and \$4,317.90 in fringe benefit contributions. Porter Decl. ¶ 3.

Based upon my review of the record and plaintiffs' counsel's answers at oral argument, I recommend that the Board's award in the minutes dated September 15, 2004 be confirmed and enforced. Pursuant to that award, I recommend that the court order defendant to submit to an audit to determine fringe benefits due on behalf of all covered laborers who worked for defendant in the specified time period and to pay plaintiffs sixty-nine hours of wages plus fringe benefits, sixty days waiting time for wages plus fringe benefits and \$50.00 for bounced check fees, for a total dollar amount of \$8,690.26 in wages, \$4,317.90 in fringe benefit contributions and \$50.00 for bounced check fees.

Plaintiffs also seek \$3,727.50 in attorneys' fees and \$389.00 in costs. Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action may be awarded to a Trust Fund that receives a judgment in its favor. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). Concepcion Lozano-Batista, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, in her Supplemental Declaration in Support of Motion for Default Judgment ("Lozano Decl."), calculates that she along with other attorneys in her firm have billed \$3,600.00 at a rate of \$225.00 an hour for time spent in prosecuting this action. See Lozano Decl. ¶ 2. From these

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figures, the court has calculated that plaintiffs' attorneys have spent sixteen hours of work on this case. Ms Lozano-Batista further declares that two paralegals, who bill at rates of \$75.00 per hour and \$90.00 per hour respectively, billed \$127.50 for work performed on this case, which is included in the total attorneys' fee request. Id. at \P 3. A review of the record and the Lozano declaration indicates that the time spent by plaintiffs' attorneys was reasonable and necessary to seek a court order confirming the Board's award and to obtain a default judgment in their clients' favor, and is therefore recoverable. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). The rate charged is also reasonable in relation to the work performed. See id. Plaintiffs also incurred \$389.00 in costs consisting of filing fees and costs associated with service of process. Lozano Decl. \P 5. Plaintiffs' request for \$3,727.50 in attorneys' fees and \$389.00 in costs is reasonable and should be awarded.

Plaintiffs also request an order that defendant pay all amounts found due and owing as a result of the audit plus interest. However, without the audit, plaintiffs cannot prove up their damages, which is necessary before the court can make such an order part of a default judgment.

Therefore, I recommend that this request be denied.

Plaintiffs also seek an order directing and permanently enjoining defendant to perform its obligations and timely submit all required monthly contribution reports, contributions due and owing plus interest and liquidated damages. "[T]he bases of injunctive relief are irreparable

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injury and inadequacy of legal remedies." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); see also Midgett v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001)("In order to be entitled to an injunction, Plaintiff must make a showing that he faces a real or immediate threat of substantial or irreparable injury."). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they face a threat of substantial or irreparable injury nor have they established that their legal remedies are inadequate. In light of the judgment for unpaid contributions and attorneys' fees and costs, I see no need for an affirmative injunction to guarantee compliance with the Agreements. I therefore recommend that the injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs be denied.

Finally, plaintiffs request that the court order an accounting between the parties, but such request is vague and appears to be indistinguishable from an audit. I recommend that the request for an accounting be denied to the extent that it is different from the audit included in the Board's award which I recommended be confirmed.

For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that judgment be entered in plaintiffs' favor for \$17,174.66, which includes \$8,690.26 in wages, \$4,317.90 in fringe benefit contributions, \$50.00 in bounced check fees, \$3,727.50 in attorneys' fees and \$389.00 in costs. I also recommend that pursuant to the Board's award defendant be ordered to submit to an audit to determine fringe benefits due on behalf of all covered laborers who worked for

defendant from the date of the last audit to the date of entry. In addition, at plaintiffs' request, I recommend that the court retain jurisdiction for six months to enforce such order.

I further recommend that plaintiffs' requests for an order enjoining defendant to timely submit all required monthly contribution reports, contributions due and owing plus interest and liquidated damages, an order for an accounting between the parties and an order for defendant to pay contributions due as result of the audit ordered and for interest on amounts due be denied.

Dated: September 14, 2006

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Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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